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We develop a model of commodity money and use it to analyze the following two questions
motivated by issues in monetary history: What are the conditions under which Gresham's
Law holds? And, what are the mechanics of a debasement (lowering the metallic content
of coins)? The model contains light and heavy coins, imperfect information, and prices
determined via bilateral bargaining. There are equilibria with neither, both, or only one
type of coin in circulation. When both circulate, coins may trade by weight or by tale.
We discuss the extent to which Gresham's Law holds in the various cases. Following a
debasement, the quantity of reminting depends on the incentives oered by the sovereign.
Equilibria exist with positive seigniorage and a mixture of old and new coins in circulation.
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Sargent, Theodosios Temzelides, and seminar participants at the Federal Reserve Banks of Minneapolis
and Philadelphia, the Penn Macro Lunch Group, the Universities of Chicago, Essex, Cambridge and Haifa,
and the 1996 SEDC conference in Mexico City.This paper develops a model where metal coins are used as media of exchange, and
uses the model to analyze two closely related questions in monetary economics: What
are the conditions under which Gresham's Law holds? And, what are the mechanics of a
debasement, an operation in which the metallic content of coins is lowered?
Gresham's Law, as it is commonly stated, asserts that bad money drives out good
money. This is usually taken to mean that when two similar commodity monies compete,
and one is in some sense inferior to the other, the inferior money will circulate and the
superior money will not, but will instead be hoarded or shipped abroad. It is invoked in a
variety of contexts, such as, for example, competition between light and heavy coins of a
given type, or between coins of dierent metals like gold and silver. Despite it being one of
the most generally accepted and frequently cited propositions in economics, we think that
existing theoretical analyses of Gresham's Law are lacking, for reasons discussed below.1
Debasements have been observed for centuries and were actually quite common in
medieval and modern European economies. The monetary system of that time consisted
of metal coins (gold and silver) produced by mints under the direct control of sovereigns.
Individuals could bring metal to the mint to be made into new coins of the same metal.
This was costly, because the total metal content of the new coins returned was less than
had been brought in, the dierence being kept as seigniorage. In normal times the mint
produced coins of a certain type, minting volumes were relatively small, and minting
generated little revenue. When the currency was debased, however, the mint provided
individuals the opportunity to voluntarily bring in old coins and receive new lighter coins
in return. Typically, the seigniorage rate was also increased, sometimes substantially.
Following debasements, minting volumes increased markedly and, combined with increased
seigniorage rates, generated substantial revenue. Minting volumes were not so large as to
remint the entire money supply, however, so that after a debasement heavy and light coins
1 Moreover, its empirical validity is questionable, or at least seems to depend on circumstances.
Laughlin (1903, 423{28), describes a variety of instances in which Gresham's Law appears to work, while
Rolnick and Weber (1986) describe several examples that seem to violate it, although Greeneld and
Rocko (1995) dispute these examples. De Roover (1949, 93) discusses the misattribution of the Law to
the 16th century English banker Thomas Gresham, and remarks: \Gresham, consequently, does not state
that bad money necessarily drives out good. On the contrary, he shows that bad money may be greatly
overvalued and will not drive out the better coins, provided that the baser coins are issued only in limited
quantity and not in excess of the needs of trade."
1circulated concurrently.2
Both the operation of Gresham's Law and the debasement facts are dicult to
understand if we approach commodity money from the perspective of standard price theory
and assume that coins derive their value from their intrinsic metallic content (something
called circulation by weight). Rolnick and Weber (1986) question Gresham's Law on the
following ground: If there exist two coins with dierent metallic content, why shouldn't
both circulate at an exchange rate that reﬂects their relative intrinsic contents? Rolnick,
Velde, and Weber (1996) argue that debasements constitute a similar puzzle: Why would
individuals voluntarily bring in old coins for reminting after a debasement if money is
valued by its metallic content? There seems to be no incentive to do so, especially given
the high seigniorage rates.
Two approaches have been adopted in the literature. The rst, which has been
used to answer both questions, is to posit a xed exchange rate between the various
competing monies, something called circulation by tale.3 T h eo r i g i no ft h i s x e dr a t e
is sometimes thought to be legal restrictions, such as legal tender laws, or \conventions
arising out of habit or ignorance." Examples of this approach are the models of commodity
money in Sargent and Wallace (1983) and Sargent and Smith (1995), models that under
some circumstances are able to generate outcomes consistent with Gresham's Law and
debasement experiences. But circulation by tale does not arise endogenously in these
models; it is simply imposed. The \conventions arising out of habit or ignorance" are not
formalized; the alternative, legal restrictions, raises problems of credibility in medieval and
early modern economies, where the powers of enforcement by the sovereign would not have
been sucient to enforce circulation by tale.4 Moreover, and this is critical, circulation by
2 Rolnick, Velde, and Weber (1996) document these facts for medieval France and England. A few
details are as follows: Between 1285 and 1490, France had 123 debasements of silver coins, 112 of more
than 5 percent, with the highest being 50 percent. France also had 64 gold debasements, 48 of more than
5 percent. In normal years, seigniorage was less than 5 percent of government revenue, but in debasement
years it could be as high as 50 percent due to increases in both seigniorage rates and mint activity. England
had a comparably stable monetary policy until the Great Debasement of Henry VIII, when silver or gold
were debased 10 times and the pound sterling lost 83 percent of its metallic content between 1542 and
1551. During this period, seigniorage, which was typically less than 2 percent, rose to as high as 57 percent
of government revenue.
3 One view is that this is a necessary condition for the empirical applicability of Gresham's Law.
For example, Friedman and Schwartz (1963, 27n) state that \Gresham's Law, that cheap money drives
out dear money, applies only when there is a xed rate of exchange between the two."
4 Miskimin (1987) notes: \[Gresham's Law] assumes that the government possesses enough political
2tale is not readily observed in the historical record: for some types of money, especially
relatively valuable ones like gold coins, it is ﬂatly contradicted, while for others the evidence
is mixed to say the least (see Rolnick, Velde, and Weber 1996).
The second approach to modeling Gresham's Law is to try to explain the departure
from standard price theory by postulating some degree of incomplete information about
the objects used as money, following the insight of Akerlof (1970) linking the operation of
Gresham's Law to a `lemons' problem.5 Aiyagari (1989) and Williamson (1992) both use
this approach in overlapping generations frameworks. In Aiyagari (1989), the distribution
of assets with dierent returns is exogenous, and buyers cannot distinguish them. In
equilibrium all assets trade at the same price, and changes in the exogenous distribution
lead to an increase in the velocity of low-return assets, a phenomenon he associates with
Gresham's Law. In Williamson (1992), a subset of agents have the ability to make high-
return or low-return investments and issue bank notes which cannot be distinguished.
Absent regulation only bad money is issued, an outcome he associates with Gresham's
Law. Banerjee and Maskin (1996) discuss a model with centralized markets for each
individual good but assume that each trader is unable to distinguish the quality of some
goods. In equilibrium, the low-quality variety of only one type of good is used as money.
The models of Banerjee and Maskin (1996) and Williamson (1992) lead to the
prediction that only bad money is ever used; thus, they do not address the observed
coexistence of dierent currencies. Aiyagari (1989) also captures the basic `lemons' insight,
but, in his own words, his model \is not designed to address questions regarding the
provision and maintenance of commodity money." We conclude that existing models that
have been applied to Gresham's Law and debasements are not well suited to deal with
the issue of which objects circulate as money, cannot deliver the concurrent circulation
of dierent monies in equilibrium, and therefore cannot be used to study the endogenous
determination of the supply of money.
In this paper, we develop a search-based (or random-matching) model in which a
force to insist upon the legal tender value of the coinage and to decree circulation at par. There is, however,
substantial evidence that neither the French nor the English monarchies gained this power until the end
of the middle ages."
5 Actually, Akerlof distinguished the Lemons Principle from Gresham's Law because, in his reading,
the latter applies when both parties know the quality of the money.
3commodity money potentially derives value beyond its intrinsic worth from its role as a
medium of exchange that helps mitigate a double coincidence of wants problem. This is,
of course, a common feature in models of commodity money (see, for example, the survey
by Ostroy and Starr 1990). With regard to this literature, our model is closest to the one
in Kiyotaki and Wright (1989). However, in order to address the substantive issues that
concern us, in this paper, we make several key changes to that model.
First, we assume that most of the objects in the model are nonstorable, which makes
it far easier to determine which, if any, ends up serving as money. In fact, by construction
the media of exchange here will necessarily be metal coins, although these coins will come
in dierent weights and it will be determined endogenously whether heavy, light, or both
circulate as money. Second, we assume that consumption goods are divisible (rather than
indivisible, as in all of the the early search-based models of commodity money), and we
employ bilateral bargaining to determine prices. In this way we can let the model determine
whether heavy and light coins circulate by weight or by tale. And, third, we also introduce
private information, by assuming that in some bilateral meetings sellers are not able to
distinguish between various types of coins. This is the ingredient that potentially allows for
the simultaneous circulation of coins of dierent weights at prices that do not necessarily
reﬂect their metallic content, and also potentially provides an incentive for some agents to
bring coins to the mint despite the loss in intrinsic content that this entails. In contrast
with the earlier models of Gresham's Law cited above, we allow for the possibility that
a fraction of sellers are informed. This distinction is crucial, for example with respect to
Aiyagari (1989), where the centralized trading requires that all buyers be uninformed, lest
prices reveal the missing information immediately.6
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 1 presents the basic model.
Section 2 denes and characterizes equilibrium and discusses Gresham's Law. Section 3
6 Technically, the model in this paper has much in common with the search-based models of at
money, such as Kiyotaki and Wright (1991, 1993); however, the coins here are distinctly commodity and
not at money in that they have intrinsic worth that depends on their weight. Bargaining was rst
introduced into search-based models of money by Shi (1995) and Trejos and Wright (1995). The private
information set-up is similar to the at money model in Williamson and Wright (1994) and the extensions
by Trejos (1994, 1996) and Kim (1996), although those papers are concerned with private information
about consumption goods and not the medium of exchange, and also the commodity money models in
Cuadras-Morat o (1994) and Li (1995).
4analyzes debasements. And in Section 4 we conclude. Proofs of many technical results are
contained in the Appendix.
I. The Basic Model
To generate an interesting role for currency in the model, we begin with a version of the
standard specication for specialization in the search-based literature on money. There
are I  3 types of consumption goods. There is a [0;1] continuum of innite-lived agents,
with equal fractions of I types who are specialists in production and consumption in the
following sense: type i only consumes good i and only produces good i + 1 (modulo I).
This rules out a double coincidence of wants in any bilateral meeting and hence rules out
direct barter. For simplicity, we also assume here that these goods are nonstorable, which
means that they must be produced and consumed simultaneously, and hence they cannot
serve as commodity money. Below we introduce metal coins to play that role.
The above consumption goods are perfectly divisible. Each agent derives utility
u(q) from consuming q units of his consumption good and derives disutility c(q) from
producing q units of his production good. We assume u(0) = 0, u0(q) > 0, u0(0) = 1,a n d
u 00(q) < 0. Also, there is a unique ^ q>0 such that u(^ q)=^ q .N o t i c et h a tu ( q ) >qif and
only if q<^ q . W i t hn ol o s si ng e n e r a l i t y ,w ec a nn o r m a l i z ec ( q )=qas long as we also
renormalize u(q) (in what follows, this merely amounts to having agents bargain over utils
rather than physical quantities of output). Agents discount the future at rate r>0.
In addition to these consumption goods, there are other objects called metal coins
that are storable and therefore can potentially serve as money. Initially, M agents are
endowed with one unit each of these objects. Coins come in two varieties: heavy (H)a n d
light (L). Coins of type H have greater intrinsic content (that is, they are heavier) than
coins of type L in a sense to be made precise below. Let Mj be the measure of agents
endowed with coins of type j,s ot h a tM H+M L=M . We call agents with money buyers
and those without money sellers.
Agents meet bilaterally according to an anonymous random-matching process with
arrival rate ; thus, =I is the probability per unit time that a buyer meets a seller who
5produces his consumption good, and also the probability per unit time that a seller meets
a buyer who consumes his production good. In any such meeting, the buyer may or may
not oer to trade his money for some amount of output to be determined endogenously.
It is assumed that buyers always trade the whole unit and not fractional amounts of their
money (say, because the coins are indivisible). It is also assumed that buyers never trade
with other buyers (say, because except for those who initially begin as sellers, agents cannot
produce until after they consume). This means that the aggregate distribution of money
holdings is constant: at every date, there are Mj buyers each with a single coin of type j
and N =1−Msellers with no money.
In this model, when two agents want to trade, q is determined by a very simple
bargaining process that gives the buyer all of the bargaining power. That is, the buyer gets
to make a take-it-or-leave-it oer, and is therefore in a position to extract all of the gains
from trade and make the seller indierent between accepting and rejecting his oer. The
model would be qualitatively similar if we adopted some other bargaining solution (such
as the symmetric Nash solution, for example), but the gain in simplicity from assuming
take-it-or-leave-it oers seems to make this a very sensible assumption for the purposes at
hand.
The dierence between coins of type H and type L is not necessarily easy to detect,
as was often the case historically, even when weight was indicated in principle by markings
on the coins.7 Following the literature cited in the Introduction, we model this by assuming
that a buyer always knows the type of coin he holds, but in any meeting a seller can
recognize the weight of a coin only with some probability , where 0    1.8 After
a transaction takes place and the buyer has departed, the seller can then determine the
weight of the coin if he did not know it before the transaction. A buyer always knows
whether a seller can recognize the weight of his coin; he cannot convince the seller of it
when the seller is uninformed.
7 Cipolla (1956, 25) comments on these diculties: "The maintenance of stable neness was very
important for the destiny of a coin and this importance was in direct correlation to the diculty of
ascertaining the neness at the moment of payment.\
8 These assumptions are meant to capture the idea that one may not always be able to verify a
coin's true content, say, because one may not always have readily available one's scale or touchstone. We
could have alternatively assumed that dierent agents have permanently dierent abilities to recognize
weight, but giving all sellers the same random chance of recognizing weight in any given meeting actually
simplies the analysis.
6Our objective is to see if these coins circulate as commodity money and at what
prices. What makes them commodity money? In this paper, we do not assume that the
coins are consumed by the agents. Rather, we assume that a holder of a coin of type j
derives a constant utility ﬂow γj,w h e r eγ Hγ L>0. This could be interpreted either as
the utility one gets from possession of the metal per se, or as a reduced form for a more
complicated story. One such story is as follows: Agents also consume a good which is
provided by traders from outside the economy. There is a constant exogenous probability
of meeting such a trader. Moreover, international trade requires the use of metal money,
and coins necessarily go by weight. To maintain a constant stock of coins, we can think of
agents as also exporting some good, and as trade being balanced so that coins return to
the economy under study.9
W h a td o e si tm e a nh e r ef o rac o i nt ocirculate? Given our bargaining solution,
sellers are always willing to trade (this is the convenience of the assumption that buyers
get to make take-it-or-leave-it oers). However, since a seller who recognizes the weight of
a coin is presumably willing to trade at a dierent price than one who does not, buyers
may not necessarily want to trade with every seller they meet. Indeed, since holding a
coin yields a ﬂow utility payment, some buyers may not want to trade with any sellers.
Let ij be the probability that a buyer with a coin of type i wants to trade with a seller
who is of type j,w h e r ej=Kmeans the weight is known and j = U means the weight
is unbeknownst to the seller. If ij = 1, the buyer prefers to trade; if ij = 0, the buyer
prefers not to trade; and if ij = , the buyer is indierent, where  is our notation for
some point in the open interval (0;1) (that is, ij =  means that buyers randomize or,
equivalently, that some buyers trade and others do not). Coins of type i circulate in this
economy if and only if ij > 0f o rs o m ej . 10
9 Under either interpretation, the utility function is assumed to be additively separable and linear
in the imported good or the utility of holding metal, so that we can use utils and quantities of metal
interchangeably.
10 We do not have to describe minting until the section on debasements, since it is assumed for now
that the stock of money is xed, but it would be possible in principle to generate a role for the mint even
without debasements by assuming that the coins depreciate or wear out over time.
7II. Equilibrium and Gresham's Law
Let qj be the amount of output a buyer of type j 2f H;Lg can get from an informed
seller, and let  q be the amount of output a buyer can get from an uninformed seller, which
obviously cannot depend on the type of coin the buyer is holding. Also, let Vj be the value
function of a buyer with a coin of type j 2f H;Lg,a n dl e tV 0be the value function of a
seller.11



























(1 − )ML[LU (VL −  q)+( 1− LU)V0]
)
: (1)
In words, V0 measures expected utility looking forward to next period, which is discounted
by r. With probability 1 − M=I, the seller does not meet someone who has money and
consumes the good the seller produces (since =I is the probability of meeting the right
type of consumer and M is the probability they have money), in which case he must remain
a seller one more period, and this conveys value V0. With probability MH=I he meets
someone who consumes his good and has a heavy coin that is recognized, in which case
with probability HK there is a trade, which conveys value VH −qH, and with probability
1 − HK there is no trade, which conveys value V0. The remaining terms have similar
interpretations.
A buyer's best take-it-or-leave-it oer makes the seller indierent between accepting
and rejecting, and therefore satises Vj − qj = V0 when the seller is informed and satises
11 The value functions, which measure maximum expected lifetime utility, are indexed by the agent's
current state (whether he is a buyer with coin H, a buyer with coin L, or a seller) but not by his
consumption-production type. Those types were introduced only to preclude direct barter, and here we
will only consider symmetric equilibria where all types use the same strategy and receive the same payo.
Also, V0 is not indexed by whether the seller can or cannot identify weight, since the value functions are
computed before meetings take place.
8VH +( 1−) V L− q=V 0 when the seller is uninformed, where  is the probability that





Inserting these values for qH, qL,a n d qinto (1) yields V0 = 0, which is natural since the
seller never gets any of the gains from trade. This, in turn, allows us from now on to
identify Vj = qj; that is, the lifetime expected utility of having a coin is simply equal to
its value in exchange. Moreover,
 q = qH +( 1−)q L; (2)
so that  q is an average of qH and qL with weights determined by the objective frequencies
of receiving heavy and light coins.
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The rst and second terms on the right-hand side are the expected payos from meeting
informed and uninformed sellers, and choosing the probability of trade in each case; the
third term is the expected payo from not meeting a seller; and the nal term γj is the
commodity value to holding the coin, which the buyer receives in all cases.12 Multiplying












jU [u( q)−Vj]+γ j: (4)
12 Under the interpretation that γj is a reduced form for trading with foreign agents, (5) seems to
indicate that the money holder simultaneously imports and exports, since after receiving γj, he keeps his
coin. It is merely a change in notation to alternatively assume that when he imports, he switches from
buyer to seller, and simultaneously (in steady state) some other agent switches from seller to buyer by
exporting (assuming that foreign buyers, just like domestic buyers, get to make take-it-or-leave-it oers).
9Finally, inserting the bargaining solution Vj = qj and letting  = N=I denote the eective
arrival rate (the probability of meeting someone who is a seller and produces the right
good), we arrive at
rqj = max
jK
jK [u(qj)−qj]+(1 − )max
 jU
jU [u( q)−qj]+γ j: (5)
Equation (5) describes the value of q =( q H ;q L) in terms of  q, which is simply
a weighted average given by (2), exogenous parameters, and the endogenous vector  =
(HK, LK, HU, LU). The latter, which determines when coins circulate, must satisfy





































where we recall that  is our notation for some point in (0;1). These conditions simply
say that the buyer trades if it makes him strictly better o, does not trade if it makes him
strictly worse o, and may randomize if he is indierent.
An equilibrium in this economy can now be conveniently dened as a pair (q;)
satisfying Bellman's equation (5) and the incentive constraints (6); remaining variables,
such as  q, can be recovered from other conditions when needed. To characterize the
set of equilibria one proceeds as follows. Given , solve (5) for q and nd the set of
parameter values such that (6) is satised; for these parameter values, (q;) constitutes an
equilibrium. It might appear that this is a lengthy exercise, because  c a nt a k eo nm a n y
dierent values; but the following preliminary lemmas dramatically reduce the number of
possible cases.
10Lemma 1. In any equilibrium, qH  qL with qH = qL if and only if γH = γL.
Lemma 2. Equilibria with HK = , LK = ,o r LU =do not exist, except possibly
for a set of measure zero in parameter space.
Lemma 1 veries that heavy coins are more valuable than light coins in exchange,
and they have the same value in exchange if and only if they have exactly the same weight.13
Lemma 2 holds for the following reason. In order for a buyer to be indierent between
trading and not trading in certain types of meetings, exogenous parameter values have to
be just right. Hence, we ignore cases where HK, LK,a n d LU are not either 0 or 1.
Things are dierent for HU, however. When a heavy coin holder meets an uninformed
seller and decides whether to trade, he must consider  q, which depends on , which itself
depends on the probability of heavy coin holders trading with uninformed sellers. Therefore
endogenous variables can potentially adjust to make a buyer with a heavy coin indierent
between trading and not trading with an uninformed seller. These considerations will also
lead below to multiple equilibria for certain parameter values.
Given the above results, it turns out that all possible equilibria fall into one of
four categories, each with its own economic interpretation. We now describe these four
categories, and characterize the set of parameter values for which each exists.
1. No-Trade Equilibrium: (LK; LU; HK; HU)=( 0 ;0 ;0 ;0).
Suppose that LK = 0. Then is is easy to show that  =0 . 14 Hence, if light coins
are not used to trade with informed sellers, then no coins are ever traded in this economy,
and, depending on the interpretation, they are either hoarded or shipped abroad. We call
this a no-trade equilibrium.
When will a no-trade equilibrium exist? Given  = 0, the solution to (5) is qi = γi=r.
13 This is an important dierence between commodity and at money. With two at monies which
only dier in, say, color, both with γ = 0, there are equilibria where they have dierent exchange values in
equilibrium (see, for example, Shi 1995). In particular, one might have positive value and the other zero
value in equilibrium, something that cannot happen with our commodity monies.
14 Recall that LK = 0 requires u(qL) <q L(indierence being ruled out as nongeneric), which
is equivalent to qL > ^ q. By Lemma 1, qH   q  qL, and therefore we also have u(qH) <q H and
u( q) <  q  qH,o r HK =0a n d HU = 0. Finally, given HU =0 ,w eh a v e=0a n d q=q L,a n dt h i s
implies LU =0 .
11In other words, when no trade is occurring, a buyer could deviate and trade a coin of type
i for qi = γi=r. He will not deviate if the incentive constraint u(qi)  qi holds for i =1 ;2.
Hence, the no-trade equilibrium exists if and only if γL=r  ^ q. In other words, if coins have
sucient intrinsic value, they will not circulate. In Figure 1, in which we will eventually
display all of the possible equilibria in (r; ) space, the no-trade equilibrium exists to the
left of the vertical line at the point corresponding to r = γL=^ q (which is r =0 : 02 for the














Figure 1: Equilibrium regions in (r; ) space (BWF and BTF indicate the by-weight
and by-tale frontiers).
Having exhausted the possible cases with LK = 0, we now assume LK =1 . I t
is easy to show that this implies LU =1 . 15 Hence, if light coins are traded to informed
15 If LK =1t h e nu ( q L)>q L,o rq L<^ q . By Lemma 1,  q  qL,a n du ( q)  u(qL) >q L. Therefore,
LU =1 .
12sellers, they are also traded to uninformed sellers. Now HK is either 0 or 1, and we
consider each in turn.
2. Single-Currency Equilibrium: (LK; LU; HK; HU)=( 1 ;1 ;0 ;0).
Given HK = 0, it is easy to show HU =0 . 16 Thus, when heavy coins are not
used in trade with informed sellers, they are never traded. We call this a single-currency
equilibrium, because only light coins circulate while heavy coins are hoarded or shipped
abroad.
When does the single-currency equilibrium exist? The incentive constraints in this
case require qL  ^ q and qH  ^ q. Now (5) implies
rqL = [u(qL)−qL]+γ L; (7a)
rqH = γH: (7b)
It is easy to show that the incentive conditions are satised if and only if γL=^ q  r 
γH=^ q.17 Hence, the single-currency equilibrium exists if the heavy coins are too intrinsically
valuable to be used as money, while the light coins are not. In Figure 1, the single-currency
equilibrium lies between the two vertical lines corresponding to r = γL=^ q and r = γH=^ q
(0.02 and 0.04 respectively).
The only remaining possibilities involve LK = LU = HK = 1. We partition
these cases into those with HU = 0 and those with HU > 0.
3. By-Weight Equilibrium: (LK; LU; HK; HU)=( 1 ;1 ;1 ;0).
If HU =0 ,t h e n=0a n d q=q L . Thus, light coins are traded always and
at the same price in all transactions, qL, while heavy coins are traded if and only if the
seller is informed at the price qH. We call this an equilibrium with circulation by weight,
because an observer of the economy would distinguish two types of coins, each circulating
16 If HK = 0, then u(qH) <q H,o rq H>^ q>q L. By Lemma 1,  q  qH, so that u( q)  u(qH) <q H
and HU =0 .
17 First, γH=r > ^ q implies qH = γH=r > u(qH) by denition of ^ q. As for the other incentive
constraint, suppose it did not hold and qL dened by (7a) is such that u(qL) <q L .I n t h a t c a s e ,
q L = γ L =r + [u(qL) − qL]=r < γL=r < ^ q, and therefore u(qL) >q L, which is a contradiction.
13at its own price, which reﬂects its intrinsic content. However, we will show below that the
exchange value of a coin is not proportional to its metallic content, and so coins do not
trade exactly by weight even with informed sellers (although they do with foreign sellers,
under the appropriate interpretation of γH and γL).
In a by-weight equilibrium, when a holder of a heavy coin meets a seller who cannot
appreciate its quality, he prefers to wait for an informed seller rather than trade now for
 q = qL. Intuitively, we would therefore expect this equilibrium to exist if agents are patient
or the fraction of informed sellers is high. More formally, in this case (5) implies
rqL = [u(qL)−qL]+γ L; (8a)
rqH = [u(qH)−qH]+γ H: (8b)
The incentive constraints require u(qL)  qL, u(qH)  qH,a n du ( q L)q H. The rst two
are easily shown to hold if and only if r  γH=^ q. Now dene the by-weight frontier  =
fw(r) as the set of points in (r; ) space such that the pair qH = qH(r; )a n dq L=q L( r; )
that solves (8a) and (8b) satises the remaining incentive constraint with equality. Note
that  = fw(r) is a (single-valued) function. Then this equilibrium exists for points above
the by-weight frontier in (r; ) space in Figure 1.
A by-weight equilibrium delivers the following version of Gresham's Law. In the
absence of light coins, heavy coins would be used in all trades.18 But when light coins are
present, heavy coins do not trade in meetings with uninformed sellers. Heavy coins are
not completely driven out of circulation, of course, since they are still used in trades with
informed sellers (and also with foreigners). In any case, it is the presence of light coins
that limits, if not eliminates, the circulation of heavy coins in this equilibrium, because it
is the presence of light coins that reduces  q. By way of contrast, in the single-currency
equilibrium heavy coins do not circulate domestically at all, but they would not circulate
even if there were no light coins (that is, even if ML =0a n d q=q H).
4. By-Tale Equilibrium: (LK; LU; HK; HU)=( 1 ;1 ;1 ;+).
We call the remaining possibility, with HU > 0, circulation by tale because, at
least in some trades, a light coin buys as much as a heavy coin. More precisely, under
18 To see this, consider Eq. (8) with γL = γH and  = 1; an equilibrium exists for r  γH=^ q.
14circulation by tale, qL <  q<q H, so that buyers obtain a premium on heavy coins and a
discount on light coins with informed sellers, and they trade either coin at the same price
with uninformed sellers. This feature is observed in both the pure strategy case where
HU = 1 and in the mixed strategy case where 0 < HU < 1. For this reason, we consider
these two types of equilibria to be variants of circulation by tale.
Consider rst the pure strategy case, with HU = 1. Intuitively, for a heavy coin
holder to spend it when the seller is uninformed, he must be impatient or the fraction of
informed sellers must be low. More rigorously, note that (5) implies
rqL = [u(qL)−qL]+(1 − )[u( q)−qL]+γ L (9a)
rqH = [u(qH)−qH]+(1 − )[u( q)−qH]+γ H; (9b)
where  q =( M Hq H+M L q L) =M. The incentive constraints require qL  ^ q, qH  ^ q,a n d
u ( q)  qH, and one can show that the nal constraint is the binding one. Following the
analysis of the by-weight equilibrium, dene the by-tale frontier  = ft(r) as the set of
points in (r; ) space such that the pair qH = qH(r; )a n dq L=q L ( r; ) that solves (9a)
and (9b) satises the relevant incentive constraint with equality. Note that  = ft(r)i sa l s o
a (single-valued) function. Then the by-tale equilibrium exists below the by-tale frontier
in (r; ) space (see Figure 1).
The following result says that the by-tale frontier always lies above the by-weight
frontier; that is, the existence regions for the two equilibria necessarily overlap, as shown
in Figure 1.
Lemma 3. The curve  = ft(r) lies above the curve  = fw(r) in (r; ) space.
Moreover, we now show that there also exists a unique mixed strategy by-tale
equilibrium, with HU = , in the region where the two pure strategy equilibria coexist.
In such an equilibrium, (5) implies
rqL = [u(qL)−qL]+(1 − )[u( q)−qL]+γ L (10a)
rqH = [u(qH)−qH]+γ H; (10b)
15where u( q)=q H (holders of heavy coins are indierent between trading and not trading





for some  2 (0;1). Equation (10b) determines qH. Then, if we insert u( q)=q H into
(10a), qL is determined. It remains to choose  2 (0;1) so that u( q)=q H.A t = 0w e
have u( q) <q H,a t=1w eh a v eu ( q) >q H,a n d qis monotone in . Hence, there is a
unique  2 (0;1) that satises u( q)=q H.
In the pure strategy by-tale equilibrium, trades with uninformed sellers always take
place, and those sellers produce the same amount of output,  q, for both types of coins. In
the mixed strategy case, the only dierence is that buyers with a heavy coin sometimes pass
up trades with uninformed sellers. In either case, we observe the concurrent circulation of
light and heavy coins, sometimes going for the same price and sometimes going at dierent
prices. Depending on how close  is to 0 or 1 (that is, depending on how hard it is to verify
weight), the proportion of by-tale trades can be arbitrarily high.
Although the mixed strategy equilibrium shares with the pure strategy by-tale equi-
librium the feature that heavy and light coins sometimes trade at the same price, the former
also shares some properties with the by-weight equilibrium. In particular, Gresham's Law
applies in the mixed strategy by-tale equilibrium, although not to the same extent that
it applies in the by-weight case, and for the same reason: the presence of light coins, by
reducing  q, makes buyers with heavy coins disinclined to trade in at least some meetings
with uninformed sellers. In the region where the dierent equilibria coexist, Gresham's
Law applies to a greater or lesser extent depending on which equilibrium we are in. Hence,
whether bad money drives out good depends at least to some extent on beliefs and not
exclusively on fundamentals.
Given that the literature (for example, Friedman and Schwartz (1963, 27n) cited
in footnote 3), requires a xed exchange rate for the operation of Gresham's Law, it may
seem paradoxical that, in this model, circulation by tale and Gresham's Law appear to
be in some sense opposites. The paradox reﬂects the subtlety of equilibrium analysis. In
the by-weight equilibrium, heavy and light coins are never traded at the same price in
16equilibrium, and light coins partially displace heavy coins (Gresham's Law). The reason
is that if heavy coins were to be used any more than they are, they would have to be
traded by tale. Thus, some form of circulation by tale does underlie the mechanism of
Gresham's Law, but only out of equilibrium. Circulation by tale, which implies that heavy
coins are used in all trades, is observed as an equilibrium outcome precisely when it fails
as a mechanism for Gresham's Law.
The reason for the multiplicity in the model is something to which we alluded earlier:
when more heavy coin holders trade with uninformed sellers, uninformed sellers rationally
increase their expectation of receiving heavy coins, which improves the terms of trade and
thereby provides greater incentive for buyers to spend their heavy coins. Moreover, when
the dierent equilibria coexist, we can Pareto rank them, and we nd that agents are worse
o when Gresham's Law applies to a greater extent (intuitively, because fewer trades get
realized).
Lemma 4. When the equilibria coexist, the pure strategy by-tale equilibrium Pareto
dominates the mixed strategy by-tale equilibrium, which dominates the by-weight equilib-
rium.
Before proceeding we want to emphasize that commodity money, as its name
suggests, is a hybrid of a commodity and money. One manifestation of this is that
qH=qL  γH=γL, with strict inequality except in the no-trade equilibrium.19 This tells
us that even in the by-weight equilibrium coins do not literally trade by weight: twice the
metal yields less than twice the value in exchange, except in foreign trade. The reason
19 The statement is obvious in the no-trade and single-currency equilibria. For the other cases, we







which leads to γHqL −γLqH = [qHu(qL)−u(qH)qL] > 0, and therefore γH=γL >q H=qL. In a (pure or




u(qH)+(1 − )u( q)+γ H
u(qL)+(1 − )u( q)+γ L
which leads to γHqL − γLqH = [qHu(qL)−u(qH)qL]+N(1 − )u( q)(qH − qL) > 0, and therefore to
t h es a m ec o n c l u s i o n .
17is that, as long as coins circulate, they have value as media of exchange in addition to
their intrinsic value as commodities. As a fraction of their total value q, the medium of
exchange component is higher for light coins.
We summarize the main results of this section as follows:
Proposition 1. The possible equilibria, which exist in the regions shown in Figure 1, are
as follows:
(1) a no-trade equilibrium where no coins circulate;
(2) a single-currency equilibrium where light coins circulate but heavy coins do not;
(3) a by-weight equilibrium where heavy and light coins always trade at dierent prices,
and heavy-coin holders never trade with uninformed sellers (a version of Gresham's
Law);
(4a) a pure strategy by-tale equilibrium where heavy and light coins sometimes trade at
the same price, and holders of heavy coins always trade with uninformed sellers;
(4b) a mixed strategy by-tale equilibrium where heavy and light coins sometimes trade
at the same price, and holders of heavy coins sometimes do and sometimes do not
trade with uninformed sellers (a partial version of Gresham's Law).
We can use Figure 1 to provide more economic intuition about the existence of the
dierent equilibria.20 Consider rst a reduction in the rate of time preference, which moves
us to the left in the gure and captures a reduction in search-type trading frictions. For
large r, we must be in a by-tale equilibrium, which indicates that very impatient buyers are
simply unwilling to wait for informed sellers. As r decreases toward γH=^ q, we eventually
must switch to a by-weight equilibrium, where buyers do wait for informed sellers and
heavy coins are at least partially withdrawn from circulation. As r decreases further, rst
below γH=^ q a n dt h e nb e l o wγ L= ^ q , rst heavy and then light coins drop out of circulation
entirely.
20 The gure was constructed for a parametric example with u(q)=q , which implies ^ q =1 ,u s i n g
=0 : 7, γL =0 : 02, γH =0 : 04, MH =0 : 2, and ML =0 : 3. The features of this example are true in the
general case, with one exception: the by-weight and by-tale frontiers are not necessarily monotone.
18Consider now how , which measures information frictions, aects the set of equilib-
ria. Figure 1 indicates that for r suciently big or small, the type of equilibrium actually
does not depend on , while for intermediate values of r it does. In this intermediate
range, as  rises from 0 to 1, we necessarily move from the pure strategy by-tale equi-
librium through the region of multiple equilibria to the by-weight equilibrium. In short,
reducing either search or information frictions (moving to the northwest in the gure)
makes it less likely that a by-tale equilibrium exists and more likely that Gresham's Law
applies.21
III. Debasement
In this section we consider the eects of a debasement. Recall that, historically, a debase-
ment was an oer by the mint to swap light for heavy coins. Now, clearly, no one would
voluntarily trade a single heavy coin for a single light coin, since the former are more
valuable, by Lemma 1. Thus, the mint would have to oer a side payment of some sort.
In practice, the side payment consisted of additional light coins; that is, the mint would
give n>1 light coins for a heavy coin, although the total metallic content of the n light
coins would have to be less than the metallic content of a single heavy coin for seigniorage
to be positive.
For reasons of tractability, we model things slightly dierently by assuming that the
side payment is in the form of real output that can be consumed immediately for an implied
utility of , and measure seigniorage in terms of  relative to the dierence in the metallic
contents of the heavy and light coins (measured in the appropriate units). The advantage
21 The relative likelihood of a by-tale or by-weight equilibrium is also related to the degree of risk-
aversion. Take two polar cases: u(q)=q(no risk-aversion) and u(q) = 1 (extreme risk aversion). It is
easy to see that the by-weight equilibrium always exists and the by-tale equilibrium never exists in the
rst case. Conversely, the by-tale equilibrium always exists and the by-weight equilibrium never exists in
the second case. The by-tale equilibrium oers more opportunity for trade, since buyers never turn down
opportunities to trade even with uninformed sellers, and therefore reduces the unconditional consumption
risk borne by agents.
We can also ask how parameters aect prices in a given equilibrium. For example, in any equi-
librium where both coins circulate, one can show @qH=@r < 0a n d@qL=@r < 0. Hence, increasing search
frictions reduces the exchange value of all coins. Also, in any equilibrium where both coins circulate,
@qH=@ > 0. Hence, increasing information frictions reduces the exchange value of heavy coins. In the
by-weight equilibrium, @qL=@ = 0; in the pure strategy by-tale equilibrium, @qL=@ < 0; and in the
mixed strategy equilibrium by-tale equilibrium, @qL=@ > 0. Hence, the eect of information frictions on
the exchange value of light coins depends on the type of equilibrium.
19of this approach is that it keeps the total number of coins constant (thus setting aside
eects due to increased liquidity), and, more importantly, implies that everyone continues
to have either one coin or zero coins, whether they go to the mint or not. This allows us to
avoid analyzing a model where agents can have more than one coin, which is much more
complicated (see Green and Zhou 1995, Zhou 1995, Molico 1995, and Camera and Corbae
1995 for papers that analyze such models in an otherwise similar framework).
Thus, we start from a situation where there are M heavy coins and no light coins
in the economy, and we assume that r>γ H= ^ q , so that the heavy coins circulate. Then,
acting on behalf of the sovereign, we oer every agent with a heavy coin the opportunity
to exchange it for a light coin plus the side payment . The post-debasement mix between
heavy and light coins depends on how many agents go to the mint, but it will always
be the case that everyone continues to have either one coin or zero coins. Modeling a
debasement in this way allows us to capture in a very simple way the following key features
of debasements: metallic content is lowered; minting is voluntarily; and we potentially
earn revenue, depending on the exogenous size of the side payment and on the endogenous
decisions of private agents.22
Given , we need to nd values for q, , and now also ML, which satisfy the
equilibrium conditions in the previous section plus a condition determining the decision to
go to the mint:
(i) ML =0i fq H>+q L;
(ii) ML = M if qH <+q L;
(iii) 0 <M L<Mimplies qH =  + qL.
Three types of outcomes are a priori possible. The rst is that no one goes to the
mint and no light coins get into circulation (ML =0a n dM H=M ). The second is that
everyone goes to the mint and all heavy coins are withdrawn from circulation (ML = M
22 Note that we assume for simplicity that private agents can go to the mint instantaneously and at
zero cost. A more complicated model could have private agents arriving at the mint randomly over time,
which would mean that light coins trickle out over time and hence would require a non-stationary analysis.
See Green and Weber (1995) for such an analysis with two dierent at monies.
20and MH = 0). The third is the case where agents are indierent between a heavy coin and
a light coin plus the side payment, some of them go to the mint and some of them do not,
and both coins circulate in equilibrium (0 <M L<Mand 0 <M H<M). We now show
that each type of equilibrium can exist for parameter values in a set of positive measure,
and that the equilibrium is generically unique. We will also show that, at least when the
frictions are serious (that is, for low enough values of  or r), debasements will generate
positive seigniorage revenue.
Consider rst case (i), an equilibrium with no reminting. We need to check that an
individual has no incentive to go to the mint, given that no one else goes. First note that
when ML = 0, a holder of heavy coin is always willing to trade with uninformed sellers,
since they always oer qH for any coin and u(qH) >q H. Given this, if the individual keeps
his heavy coin, he obtains the payo VH = qH,w h e r e
rqH = [u(qH)−qH]+γ H: (12a)
If he deviates and goes to the mint, he obtains the side payment  plus the continuation
payo VL = qL,w h e r e
rqL = [u(qL)−qL]+(1 − )[u(q H)−q L]+γ L: (12b)
Let (qH;q L) be the unique solution to (12), and let 1 = qH −qL. Then it is an equilibrium
for no one to go to the mint if and only if the side payment is smaller than 1.
Now consider case (ii), where everyone goes to the mint. An individual who does
so obtains the side payment plus the continuation payo VL = qL,w h e r e
rqL = [u(qL)−qL]+γ L: (13a)
If he deviates and keeps his heavy coin, he obtains VH = qH, where now
rqH = [u(qH)−qH]+(1 − )max
 HU
HU [u(qL)−qH]+γ H: (13b)
This assumes that he will trade a heavy coin when he meets an informed trader (that

















Figure 2: Equilibria after debasement, depending on the side payment and .
trader (that is, it allows either a by-tale or a by-weight equilibrium). Proceeding as in the
previous case, let 2 be the dierence between the values of qH and qL that solve (13).
Then it is an equilibrium for everyone to go to the mint if and only if the side payment
exceeds 2.
We illustrate the properties of 1 and 2 as functions of  in Figure 2, which is based
on the following lemma.
Lemma 5. As functions of , 1() and 2() are both upward-sloping, 2(1) = 1(1),
2(0)  1(0) = (γH − γL)=(r + ),a n d 2(  )> 1(  )for all  2 (0;1).
A key part of this result is that there is a nonempty region where the side payment
falls between 1 and 2, and in this region neither ML =0n o rM L=Mis an equilibrium.
We now show that in this region there is a unique equilibrium where ML adjusts so that
22agents are indierent between going and not going to the mint: qH = qL − . Such an
equilibrium must be a by-tale equilibrium, because in a by-weight equilibrium qH and qL
do not depend on ML, so this indierence is generically not possible. Given this, the
equilibrium conditions for this case are
rqH = [u(qH)−qH]+(1 − )[u( q)−qH]+γ H (14a)
rqL = [u(qL)−qL]+(1 − )[u( q)−qL]+γ L: (14b)
These conditions can be combined to yield one equation in qL,n a m e l y ,
( r+ )=[u(qL +)−u(qL)] + γH − γL: (15)
Equation (15) can be solved uniquely for qL. Once we know qL and qH = qL + ,w e
simply have to nd a value of ML in (0;1) such that the implied value of  q satises (14a).
A little analysis indicates that one can do so if and only if  is between 1 and 2,a n dt h e
value of ML is unique. As  increases in this range, ML increases from 0 to some upper
bound. This upper bound is M when  is less than some 0 2 [0;1], and less than M when
 exceeds 0 (see the proof of Lemma 5).
We emphasize that in an equilibrium with 0 <M L<Mbuyers always trade heavy
coins to uninformed sellers; that is, it is a pure strategy by-tale equilibrium. For generic
values of , this is the only type of equilibrium with 0 <M L<Mthat is possible; but for
certain values of ,i f= 2(  ), then there also exists a by-weight equilibrium and a mixed
strategy by-tale equilibrium with ML 2 (0;M) (see the proof of Lemma 5 for details).23
We now consider the net revenue generated by a debasement, which is given by the
capitalized value of the dierence in the two coins' metallic content minus the one-time








23 It may seem surprising that coins generically trade by tale in any equilibrium where some agents
go to the mint and others do not, given that in the previous section we found by-tale or by-weight or both
equilibria exist depending on parameters. The key here is that the nature of the equilibrium also depends
on ML, which is now endogenous. At the equilibrium value of ML 2 (0;M), after a debasement, trade is
by tale.
23Recall from Lemma 5 that 1(0) = (γH −γL)=(r+). Hence, for suciently low values of
, we can guarantee that there is a  that is large enough to elicit at least some reminting
and yet small enough to earn net revenue R>0. One can also show that for suciently
small r we can choose  so that complete reminting occurs and R>0 regardless of the
value of .
Suppose we want to maximize revenue. Obviously, R is 0 at   1 (since no
one goes to the mint) and decreasing in  when > 2(since everyone is already going
to the mint). Hence, R is maximized when 1 < 2 . Although we have not been
able to characterize the results analytically, numerical examples indicate that both < 2
and  = 2 may maximize R for dierent parameter values. When R is maximized at
< 2, there is partial reminting after a seigniorage-maximizing debasement: some agents
voluntarily bring in their coins, others do not. In this case heavy and light coins both
circulate, at the same price in trade with uninformed sellers and at dierent prices in trade
with informed sellers.24 These features of the model seem consistent with the historical
experience of debasements, and are features not shared by other models that we know of.
We summarize the main results of this section in the following proposition. Most
of the results are obvious from the preceding discussion; some of the more technical points
follow from the proof of Lemma 5 in the Appendix.
Proposition 2. There exist critical values of the side payment, 1 and 2, shown in
Figure 2 as functions of , with the following properties:
(1)   1 implies ML =0(no reminting);
(2) > 2implies ML = M (complete reminting);
(3) 1 << 2implies a determinate value of ML 2 (0;M) (partial reminting) and
circulation by tale;
24 If revenues are maximized for  = 2, then the outcome depends on the parameters. More pre-
cisely, when (r; ) is in the by-weight region in Figure 1, a side payment of 2 results in a by-weight
equilibrium with an indeterminate mixture of heavy and light coins (although by-weight equilibria with
partial reminting are nongeneric, they do exist when  = 2) . A n dw h e n( r;) is not in the by-weight
region in Figure 1, the outcome is a complete reminting. See the proof of Lemma 5 for details.
24(4)  = 2 (which, although nongeneric for exogenous parameter values, may occur
endogenously with revenue maximization) implies one of two cases: if (r; ) is in the
by-weight region of Figure 1, then ML is indeterminate and we have circulation by
weight, and if it is not in that region, then ML =1 ;
5) small r or  implies that debasements can yield R>0 , and depending on parame-
ters, maximizing R can yield either  = 2 or 1 << 2.
IV. Conclusion
We have constructed a random-matching or search-based model of commodity money and
used it to study the circulation of various types of coins, without prior assumptions on
which monies are used in which circumstances (as in cash-in-advance models) or on their
rates of exchange (as in models that impose circulation by tale). The framework allows
us to analyze the meaning and applicability of Gresham's Law, which we identify as a
feature of a particular type of equilibrium whereby individuals abstain from trading good
money { heavy coins in our model { in at least some opportunities. It those equilibria, bad
money drives out good, in the sense that if there were no light coins in the economy then
heavy coins would be used in all opportunities. Given private information, the presence
of light coins contaminates the money supply and thereby reduces the amount a seller is
willing to produce for coins whose weight he cannot recognize. The reduction in quantity,
or, equivalently, the increase in price, is what limits the circulation of heavy coins.
Gresham's Law holds in what we called the by-weight equilibrium, where heavy
coins always buy more than light coins (although not in strict proportion to their weight).
It also holds to a lesser extent in the mixed strategy by-tale equilibrium, but not in the
pure strategy by-tale equilibrium. In this latter case, all coins are traded in every meeting
despite the fact that the heavy and light coins circulate by tale. By-tale circulation is more
likely to obtain when information or search frictions are severe. For some values of the
parameters the dierent types of equilibrium coexist, in which case they can be ranked in
terms of welfare. This says that the extent to which Gresham's Law holds can depend on
25beliefs as well as fundamentals, and that it matters: the economy is worse o when bad
money drives out good.
We also use the framework to analyze debasements. The goal was to capture the
following historical observations from Rolnick, Velde, and Weber (1996): (1) After a de-
basement some individuals voluntarily went to the mint to trade heavy coins for light coins.
(2) They left with less total metal than they brought in, the dierence being retained as
seigniorage. (3) Debasements generated signicant revenue. (4) Not all heavy coins were
brought in, so that old and new coins circulated concurrently after a debasement. (5)
Coins seemed to circulate by weight at least some of the time and by tale at other times.
Our model can generate exactly these phenomena for some parameter values. In particu-
lar, the number of agents that go to the mint is determined endogenously, and when both
heavy and light coins circulate after a debasement, they typically trade at the same price
in some meetings and at dierent prices in others. These predictions are not shared by
other models that we know of.
One key ingredient in the model is our private information assumption, that with
some probability a seller is not able to distinguish between the coins. Given what we know
about history, how reasonable is this? Although there were typically markings on the new
coins that in principle distinguished them from the old coins after a debasement, these
may have been dicult to detect or interpret, especially when debasements were frequent,
because there could then be coins of many dierent vintages in simultaneous circulation.
(As an aside, recall that the model predicts it is easier to debase when  is smaller, which
suggests a possible motive for the mints not wanting to make the new and old coins too
recognizably dierent.) In any case, even without private information (that is, even with
 = 1), it is possible to generate revenue from a debasement for some values of the other
parameters (for example, small r). However, without some private information we would
not observe either the phenomenon of circulation by tale or Gresham's Law, since these
both revolve around what happens when one meets an uniformed seller.
26Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: We rst prove that qL  qH. Suppose qL >q H. The proof consists
of examining the various possible values for the vector  and deriving a contradiction.
Consider rst the case LK =2(0;1). This means that u(qL)=q L , that is,
qL =^ q . By assumption, qH <  q<^ q , which implies HK =1 , HU =1 .M o r e o v e r ,u ( q) 
u(qL)=q Lor LU[u( q)−qL] = 0 and therefore qL = γL=r.S i n c eq Hγ H =r > γL=r we
have a contradiction.
Consider now HK = : by similar reasoning it can be shown that qL = γL=r,
yielding the same contradiction. Consider the case HK =0 :u ( q H)<q H implies qH > ^ q;
by assumption qL   q>q H so LK =0a n d LU = 0. This implies qL = γL=r < γH=r 
qH, a contradiction.
Having ruled out HK = 0 or , only HK = 1 remains. It implies that u(qH) >q H,
and by assumption  q>q H so u( q) >u ( q H )>q H or HU = 1. Suppose LK =0 :
u ( q L )<q Limplies u( q) <q Lor LU =0a n dq L=γ L =r which, as before, contradicts
qL <q H . Since we have already ruled out LK = ,o n l y LK = 1 remains. Since
HU = 1, then either LU =0o r LU > 0.
In the rst case, qH = qand the Bellman equations reduce to
rqH = [u(qH)−qH]+γ H
rqL = [u(qL)−qL]+γ L:
Clearly, qL < [ u ( q L) − q L] =r+γH=r. Consider the function f(q)= [ u ( q ) − q ] =r+γH=r−q:
this function satises f(0) > 0, f(^ q) < 0, f(qH)=0a n df 0( q ) changes sign at most once
because u0 is decreasing: therefore f changes sign only once, and f(q) > 0 implies q<q H.
This shows that qL <q H which is a contradiction.
The only case that remains is then HK = LK = HU =1 , LU > 0. In this case,






















Note that g(0) > 0, g(^ q)< 0, and g0 changes sign at most once, so that g starts as positive
and changes sign only once. Since g(qH)=0a n dg ( q L)=( γ H−γ L= ( r+ )>0, it must
be that qL <q H, a contradiction.
This establishes that that qL  qH. To conclude the proof, simply notice that when
qL = qH = qBellman's equations are satised if and only if γH = γL.
Proof of Lemma 2: Suppose HK = , which means u(qH)=q H. By Lemma 1,
u( q)  u(qH)=q H , which means that HU[u( q) − qH] = 0. Using (5), we nd that
rqH = γH. This can be an equilibrium only if u(γH=r)=γ H=r, which is not generic.
Suppose LK = , which means u(qL)=q L=^ q . Then, by Lemma 1, qH >q L=^ q
so that u(qH) <q H and therefore HK = 0. Also, by Lemma 1,  q  qH so that u( q) 
u(qH) <q H and therefore HU = 0; this means  =0a n d q=q L. In (5), this allows to
solve for qL = γL=r which must satisfy u(γL=r)=γ L=r, which is not generic.
Finally, suppose LU = , which means u( q)=q L. By Lemma 1, qL <q H so that
u( q)=q L<q Hand HU = 0. Again, this implies  =0a n d q=q L. Therefore u(qL)=q L
and LK[u(qL)−qL] = 0, so that qL = γL=r and the condition u(γL=r)=γ L=r must hold,
which is also not generic.
P r o o fo fL e m m a3 : The by-weight frontier  = fw(r) is dened by:
rqL = [u(qL)−qL]+γ L (17a)
rqH = [u(qH)−qH]+γ H (17b)
qH = u(qL)( 1 7 c )
The by-tale frontier  = ft(r) is dened by:
rqL = [u(qL)−qL]+(1 − )(q H −q L)+γ L (18a)
rqH = [u(qH)−qH]+γ H (18b)
qH = u[qH +( 1−)q L]( 1 8 c )
28with  = MH=M.
Consider the by-weight frontier rst, and x .I n t h e ( q H ;q L) plane, (17a) and
(17b) dene a curve parameterized by r ( c a l li tc u r v eA ). We look for an intersection of
curve A with the curve dened by (17c) (call it curve B)a srvaries from γH=^ q to +1.
First, we establish the properties of curve A.F o rr=γ H = ^ q ,q H( r )=^ qand qL(r) <







r −  [u0 (qL) − 1]
r − [u0(qH)−1]
and 0 <d q H=dqL <q H=qL, because (17a) and (17b) together with concavity of u imply
r> [ u 0 ( q L )−1] and r>  [ u 0 ( q H)−1 ]( s e ep r o o fo fL e m m a4 ) ,a n dq L<q H implies
u0(qH) <u 0( q L)w h i c hl e a d st or− [ u 0( q L)−1] <r−[u0(qH)−1]. Therefore, curve A
is increasing and concave.
On the other hand, curve B (which is the graph of u)s t a r t sa tt h ep o i n t( 0 ; 0)
with lim(qH=qL)=u 0(0) = +1, is increasing and concave, and includes the point (^ q; ^ q).
Since curve A starts at (0;0) with nite slope, it is initially below curve B, but it is above
curve B when it intersects the horizontal line qH = γ=^ q. Therefore, there is at least one
intersection of the two curves, that is, at least one value of r for any  2 [0;1] for which
the by-weight frontier is well-dened.
The same reasoning can be applied to the by-tale frontier: equations (18a) and
(18b) dene another curve (call it A0) in the same (qH;q L) plane with the same properties,
and for each  2 [0;1] there is at least one r for which this curve intersects the curve
dened by (18c) (call it curve B0).
For  =1 ,c u r v e sAand A0 coincide. This leads to Figure 3, which shows that the
lowest value rt such that (rt;1) is on the by-tale frontier is smaller the the lowest value rw
such that (rw;1) is on the by-weight frontier. Inspection of equations (17) and (18) shows
that the two frontiers cannot intersect on their interior (unless  q = qL, which occurs when
MH = 0). Therefore, the by-weight frontier always lies below the by-tale frontier in the
















Figure 3: Existence of by-weight and by-tale frontiers.
Proof of Lemma 4: We will use a pair of functions to establish an ordering on the
equilibrium values in the pure-strategy by-tale (PBT), mixed-strategy by-tale (MBT)a n d
by-weight (BW) equilibria.
For i = H;L, dene the function
Fi (q;x)=[u(q)−q]+(1 − )(x−q)+γ i−rq
on [0; ^ q]2. For any x, Fi(0;x)= (1−)x + γi > 0a n dF i(^ q;x)= (1−)(x−^ q)+γ i−r^ q<




<  u( q )=q − (r + )=
F i( q;x)−Fi(0;x)
q
30so that Fi(;x) is concave (notice that @Fi=@q does not depend on x). Therefore the
solution to Fi(q;x) = 0 is unique (given x). By the implicit function theorem, there is a
function qi(x) such that Fi[q(x);x] = 0, and it can be shown that q0(x) > 0.
We use the following notation for the equilibrium values: q
H, q and q
L in the PBT
equilibrium, dened by (9); q
+
H, q +and q
+
L in the MBT equilibrium, dened by (10); and
qH and qL in the BW equilibrium, dened by (8).
Consider rst q
H and qH. For some ~ q between q
H and qH,w eh a v e



















H)+(1 − ) (19)
Suppose qH >q 
H: then the left-hand side of (19) is positive (since the incentive constraint
in a PBT equilibrium is u( q)>u ( q 
H)). On the other hand, q
H < ~ q<q H and
@FH=@q(~ q;q




H;u( q)] < −FH [0;u( q)]=q
H
< − (1 − )u( q)=q
H − γH < − (1 − );
recalling that @F=@q does not depend on its second argument, and that, by (9), we have
FH[q
H;u( q)] = 0. It follows that the right-hand side of (19) is negative, a contradiction.
Therefore q
H  qH.
We now rank q
L and qL.F i r s t , w e s e e t h a t u ( q) >u ( q L ); otherwise, u(qL) >
u( q) >q 
H q H which violates the incentive constraint for a BW equilibrium. Next, by
(9), FL[q
L;u( q)] = 0 and by (8), FL[qL;u(q L)] = 0; therefore, from the properties of FL,
qL <q 
L:aPBT equilibrium Pareto-dominates a BW equilibrium.
Now, consider the MBT equilibrium: by (10), FL(q
+
L;q H)=0a n dF L[ q L;u(q L)] =
0; the incentive constraint in a BW equilibrium being qH >u ( q L), by the properties of FL
we have that qL <q
+
L.N o t i c et h a tq H=q
+
H, since (8a) and (10a) are identical. Therefore
a MBT equilibrium dominates a BW equilibrium.
31To conclude, FL[q
L;u( q)] = 0 and FL(q
+
L;q H) = 0; and u( q) >q 




L.S i n c eq 
H>q H=q
+
H,aPBT equilibrium dominates a MBT equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma 5: Consider the rst the maximal side payment for which an equi-
librium results where no one goes to the mint, 1 = qH − qL,w h e r eq H and qL solve (12).

































As  varies, qH = q
H is a constant. It can be shown that the value of qL for  =0i s
greater than q







and that u0(qL)−(r +) < 0f o rq L>q 
L, using (22) and the concavity property that
u0(q)q<u ( q ). Therefore, for all , qL is decreasing in ,a n d 1 (  ) is increasing in 
since @1=@ = −@qL=@.T h e v a l u e s o f q Hand qL, which are the values for a by-tale
equilibrium with ML = 0, are shown in Figure 4 (they are marked BT0).
We now study the minimal side payment size for which an equilibrium results where
everyone goes to the mint. Let 2 = qH −qL where qH and qL solve (13). When HU =1 ,
from (13) we have
rqL = [u(qL)−qL]+γ L

















Figure 4: Value of Heavy and Light Coins after Debasement (r given).
as long as these values satisfy u(qL) >q H.N o t et h a tq L=q 
Ldoes not vary with , while
qH does; these values correspond to a by-tale equilibrium with ML = M, and are plotted
in Figure 4 as BT1.
When qH reaches u(q
L), HU becomes 0, from (13) we have:
rqL = [u(qL)−qL]+γ L
rqH = [u(qH)−qH]+γ H:
These values correspond to a by-weight equilibrium and are plotted in Figure 4 as marked
BW.A sincreases, HU = 0 while  lies inside the by-weight region, and HU switches
to 1 at the by-weight frontier. From Figure 1, we know that values of  inside the by-
weight region lie in an interval [0;1] where 0 = f−1
w (r) in the notation of Lemma 3 and
0  0  1. Thus, 2 is dened in at most two pieces, a
2()f o r[ 0 ; 0]w i t h HU =1 ,a n d
 b
2(  )f o r[  0;1] with HU =0 .
33Consider rst the case where HU = 1. The expression for a




2 ()=q H−q L=

r+


















L)] + 1 (0) = 1 (1):
A comparison of (20) and (23), and the concavity of u,i m p l yt h a t 1 (  )= a
2(  )o n l yf o r
= 0 or identical values of qH and qL, which can only happen at  =1w h e r eq L=q 
L
and qH = q









r +  − u0(qH)
> 0;







But the pair (qH;q L) in the all-heavy equilibrium strictly dominates the pair (qH;q L)i n
the all-light equilibrium (see Figure 4), while the dierence qH − qL is equal; therefore
u(qH)−u(qL) is larger in the all-light equilibrium, and @(a
2 −1)=@j=0 > 0. This shows
that 2  1 for all  with equality only at  =0a n d=1 .
We now consider the case where HU = 0. Then, b















Note that, for  =1 ,q H =q 
H and b
2(1) = 1(1). It is easy to check that @qH=@ is
still positive; so that the qualitative features of 2 are unchanged, except for the fact that
b
2(0) > 1(0); thus, in the cases where 0 =0 ,t h e n 2does not coincide with 1 at 0.
For values of the side payment exactly equal to b
2, a by-weight equilibrium can
result from debasement, with ML indeterminate, since the equilibrium values qH and qL
34are such that qH =  + qL and satisfy the by-weight conditions; but values in a by-weight
equilibrium do not depend on ML, so that the amount of minting following a debasement
is indeterminate. This occurs only when  is exactly equal to b
2, which is non-generic.
Note, however, that  = b
2 is consistent with another pair of equilibrium values, namely
qH and qL for a by-tale equilibrium where HU =0a n dM L<M . Thus, 2 can be seen
as consistent with a by-tale, ML = M equilibrium for [0; 0]a n dw i t hab y - w e i g h to ra
by-tale, ML <Mequilibrium for [0;1].
REFERENCES
Aiyagari, S. Rao. \Gresham's Law in a Lemons Market for Assets." Canadian Journal of
Economics, August 1989, 22(3), pp. 686{97.
Akerlof, George A. \The Market for `Lemons': Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mech-
anism." Quarterly Journal of Economics, August 1970, 84(3), pp. 488{500.
Banerjee, Abhijit V. and Eric S. Maskin. \A Walrasian Theory of Money and Barter."
Quarterly Journal of Economics, November 1996, 111(4), pp. 955{1005.
Camera, Gabriele and Dean Corbae. \On the Distribution of Money and Prices with
Search." Mimeo, University of Iowa, 1996.
Cipolla, Carlo M. Money, Prices and Civilization in the Mediterranean World, Fifth to
Seventeenth Century. New York: Gordian Press, 1956.
Cuadras-Morat o, Xavier. \Commodity Money in the Presence of Goods of Heterogeneous
Quality." Economic Theory, May 1994, 4(3), pp. 579{91.
Friedman, Milton and Anna J. Schwartz. A Monetary History of the United States, 1867{
1960. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963.
Green, Edward J. and Warren E. Weber. \Will the New $100 Bill Decrease Counterfeiting?"
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review, Summer 1996, 19(3), pp.
3-10.
35Green, Edward J. and Ruilin Zhou. \A Rudimentary Model of Search with Divisible Money
and Prices." Mimeo, University of Pennsylvania and Federal Reserve Bank of Min-
neapolis, 1996.
Greeneld, Robert L., and Hugh Rocko. \Gresham's Law in Nineteenth-Century Amer-
ica." Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, November 1995, 27(4), pp. 1086{98.
Kim, Young Sik. \Money, Barter and Costly Information Acquisition."Journal of Monetary
Economics, February 1996, 37(1), pp. 119{42.
Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro and Randall Wright. \On Money as a Medium of Exchange." Journal
of Political Economy, August 1989, 97(4), pp. 927{54.
Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro, and Randall Wright. \A Contribution to the Pure Theory of Money."
Journal of Economic Theory, April 1991, 53(2), pp. 215{35.
Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro, and Randall Wright. \A Search-Theoretic Approach to Monetary
Economics." American Economic Review, March 1993, 83(1), pp. 63{77.
Laughlin, J. Laurence. The Principles of Money. New York: G. Scribner's Sons, 1903.
Li, Yiting. \Commodity Money under Private Information." Journal of Monetary Eco-
nomics, December 1995, 36(3), pp. 573{92.
Miskimin, Harry. \Money, the Law and Legal Tender," in Georges Depeyrot, Tony Hackens,
Ghislaine Moucharte, eds., Rythmes de la production mon etaire de l'antiquit e an o s
jours. Louvain-la-Neuve: Coll ege  Erasme, 1987.
Molico, Miguel. \The Distribution of Money and Prices in Search Equilibrium." Mimeo,
University of Pennsylvania, 1996.
Ostroy, Joseph M., and Ross M. Starr. \The Transaction Role of Money," in Benjamin M.
Friedman and Frank K. Hahn, eds., Handbook of Monetary Economics. Amsterdam:
North-Holland, 1990.
Rolnick, Arthur J., and Warren E. Weber. \Gresham's Law or Gresham's Fallacy?"Journal
of Political Economy, February 1986, 94(1), pp. 185{99.
36Rolnick, Arthur J., Fran cois R. Velde, and Warren E. Weber. \The Debasement Puzzle: An
Essay in Medieval Monetary Economics." Journal of Economic History, December
1996, 56(4), pp. 789{808.
De Roover, Raymond. Gresham on Foreign Exchange. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1949.
Sargent, Thomas J., and Bruce D. Smith. \Coinage, Debasements, and Gresham's Laws."
Economic Theory, 1997, forthcoming.
Sargent, Thomas J., and Neil Wallace. \A Model of Commodity Money." Journal of Mon-
etary Economics, July 1983, 12(1), pp. 163{87.
Shi, Shouyong. \Money and Prices: A Model of Search and Bargaining." Journal of Eco-
nomic Theory, December 1995, 67(2), pp. 467{498.
Trejos, Alberto, and Randall Wright. \Search, Bargaining, Money, and Prices." Journal of
Political Economy, February 1995, 103(1), pp. 118{141.
Trejos, Alberto. \Money, Prices and Private Information." Mimeo, Northwestern Univer-
sity, 1994.
Trejos, Alberto. \Incentives to Produce Quality and the Liquidity of Money." Economic
Theory, 1997, forthcoming.
Williamson, Stephen D. \Laissez-Faire Banking and Circulating Media of Exchange." Jour-
nal of Financial Intermediation, June 1992, 2(2), pp. 134{67.
Williamson, Stephen D., and Randall Wright. \Barter and Monetary Exchange Under
Private Information." American Economic Review, March 1994, 84(1), pp. 104{23.
Zhou, Ruilin. \Inventory Holdings of Money and Indeterminacy of Search Equilibrium"
Mimeo, University of Pennsylvania and Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, 1996.
37